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On a forum like GA, often people feel free to discuss delicate personal topics about various kinds of relationships and life situations. In most cases, I have found the advice offered to members to be well thought out, empathic, and compassionate. Occasionally, I have checked out other forums and have seen some mean spirited responses to a sensitive problem. Rather than being helpful, apparently the response was calculated to be mean spirited and cruel, IMO. I believe one of the great strengths of this forum is that members are able to "bare our souls" to other mature adults, with the expectation that your feelings are treated with respect. We have all gone through personal dilemmas, and the more mature and compassionate amongst us realize that there is no "one size fits all" answer to a problem. One of the things that separate GA from many other forums I have visited is the mature, thoughtful compassion and empathy that is demonstrated by the vast majority of its members. As my grandfather used to say "you've got to know how to separate the sugar from the salt." Well that's all I have to say. For now anyway

I agree, nice to see everyone!

Thank you Krista. We did have a good time and I was happy he didn

We actually had a good time. Went to see a musical in Long Beach called The Alter Boys, and then went out for sushi.

Thank you Krista, well I might be a little nervous when he shows up in 20 minutes lol. But I am kind of looking forward to it

Tonight will be my first date in three years. He

I can admit I do have that problem with one of the Dell laptops I have. The one I have at home I have to place a small book under it so it doesn

I just realized that I almost never do anything on impulse. I'm such a creature of habit. Damn, it, I have to start being more spontaneous What about you? Are you a creature of habit or do you just do anything on impulse, having always been Roman Catholic I am very familiar with habits.

Why should someone donate blood to an organization that doesn't value you and thinks an entire group of people has a terminal disease? What about heterosexual

Excellent James There is a lot of truth to that statement. Due process protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of EVERY FACT NECESSARY to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged. The government must prove the essential elements of the crime charged. The essential elements of the crime of attempt are 1) specific intent to commit the underlying substantive crime, and 2) overt act. The critical overt act element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. EVIDENCE of the overt act must be sufficient to prove (to allow a rational jury to conclude) that the accused engaged in CONDUCT "very near to the accomplishment" of the attempted offense. People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1929). The law of criminal attempt "considers those acts only as tending to the commission of the crime which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable PROBABILITY the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference. Under Rule 401, Federal Rules of EVIDENCE, ""Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 402 provides, "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Certainly, in a prosecution for the crime of attempt, any evidence that shows that the Defendant's conduct did or did not come dangerously close to the accomplishment of the attempted offense is relevant and admissible. There is no existing ACT of CONGRESS or Supreme Court rule that makes evidence of "impossibility" inadmissible to demonstrate the probable existence or nonexistence of an essential element of a crime (e.g., the critical overt act element of the crime of attempt). Although some claim "impossibility" has been "thoroughly discredited" as a defense, you cannot deny that evidence of "impossibility" is relevant and admissible if the evidence tends to make the existence of a essential fact (element) of a crime less probable. In defining crimes, Congress often uses the word "endeavor" in place of the word "attempt." Although the Supreme Court previously failed to apprehend that the two words are synonymous when it said in dicta that using the word "endeavor" gets rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word "attempt," U.S. v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921), no substitution of a word in a statute can evade the essential purpose of the law to regulate and punish wrongful CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court later noted that an "endeavor" to commit a crime cannot be punished unless the endeavor has the "natural and probable effect" of bringing about the wrong that the law seeks to prohibit. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). Citation of authority; In United States v. Aguilar, the defendant was convicted of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The Court examined the relevant evidence admitted at trial to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court, citing Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893) stated, "a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court UNLESS it appears that he KNEW or had notice that justice was being administered by such court." A person lacking knowledge of a judicial proceeding lacks the evil intent to obstruct. Accordingly, the elements of "endeavoring" to obstruct the due administration of justice are 1) specific intent to obstruct a pending proceeding, and 2) an overt act that has the "natural and probable effect" of obstructing a pending proceeding. The court stated; "We have traditionally exercised RESTRAINT in assessing the REACH of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to Congress [citation omitted], and out of concern that 'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do IF A CERTAIN LINE is passed.'" [Note: At common law, evidence of mere preparation to commit a crime was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a criminal attempt. The CERTAIN LINE, where criminality would attach, was drawn at the point where the conduct came dangerously close to the commission of the actual crime.] In Aguilar, the Court considered conduct that falls before or after that CERTAIN LINE. If the defendant had delivered his false statement directly to the grand jury, then he would be criminally liable for endeavoring to obstruct justice. However, defendant's conduct fell short of that CERTAIN LINE. Defendant delivered his false statement to a government agent who was not subpoenaed or otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury. It is far too speculative to determine whether his conduct would tend to obstruct justice. The Court stated, "We think it [defendant's conduct] cannot be said to have the 'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice. In response to Scalia's dissent, the Court said: "JUSTICE SCALIA'S dissent criticizes our treatment of the statutory language for reading the word 'endeavor' out of it, inasmuch as it excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would 'only unnaturally and improbably be sucessful.' This criticism is unwarranted. Our reading of the statute gives the term 'endeavor' a useful function to fulfill: it makes conduct punishable where the defendant acts with an INTENT TO OBSTRUCT justice, in in a manner that is LIKELY TO OBSTRUCT justice, but is foiled in some way." In other words, the essential overt act element of the crime of "endeavor" (like the overt act element of the crime of attempt) must be an act that will LIKELY (naturally and probably) be successful (e.g., come dangerously close to the actual commission of the prohibited wrong) unless it is foiled in some way. Accordingly, unless the accused KNOWS that an actual pending proceeding--and unless the accused KNOWS that his false statements will in fact be delivered to an actual pending proceeding--it is improbable (impossible) for him to endeavor to obstruct the due administration of justice, and THUS, he is NOT CULPABLE. I find the Aguilar case to be a PARADOX in many respects--and worthy of considerable discussion--but in final analysis, the fact remains that no matter how hard the legislature or the courts work to GET RID of the "technicalities" that allegedly plague the law of criminal attempt--those "technicalities" were developed at common law for a reason. Fundamental due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments does not allow the law to penalize an individual's thoughts or beliefs (or status) no matter how morally reprehensible those thoughts or beliefs (or status) may be. The law may only constitutionally prohibit and penalize harmful conduct--and conduct that has no likelihood of causing the harm that the law seeks to prohibit is NOT CULPABLE. Accordingly, due to fundamental constitutional principles, the PROBABILTY or IMPROBABILITY (and thus POSSIBILITY and IMPOSSIBILITY) of success in committing the intended crime will ALWAYS be admissible evidence that is relevant to the culpability of the accused actor's CONDUCT with respect to the inchoate crime of attempt (and the synonymous inchoate crime of endeavor). The Supreme Court is the final say and the Constitution will always rein supreme.

I purchased a couple of Dell Inspiron lap tops. One for home and one for the office. I've had them both for three years now and haven't had a problem with either. Here is a link to their site. http://www.dell.com/content/products/categ...;l=en&s=dhs

My avatar is my son Justin who was killed by a drunk driver. It will be three years this June 13th. The drunk driver was my ex-wife who had a few cocktails at home but had promised to take Justin to the local dairy queen for an ice cream; just two miles down the street, she ran a stop sign and was broad sided by an SUV. She was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence and was only sentenced to three years.

For the most part, all of us have chosen an avatar to pictorially represent us on this site. Why did you pick the avatar, which you now have? Is there any psychological significance to your choice of an avatar? Was your choice really only made in good fun, or is there some secret meaning to your choice? Psychologists frequently tell us, that we as humans, are what we wear on our bodies. Are you what your avatar portrays on your computer screen?

Boy you guys bring up some pretty good points. Prosecutors are responsible for charging the appropriate crime. However, prosecutors routinely stack the deck in their favor by charging both criminal attempt and attempted enticement. The time is long overdue for prosecutors to be held accountable for their misuse of law. Criminal attempt is a specific intent crime. It requires the defendant to specifically intend to commit a particular crime and he must purposefully/intentionally engage in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. A substantial step goes beyond mere preparation and is suitable for the purpose of committing the intended crime, but fails to result in the commission of the intended crime. I will acknowledge that "attempted attempt" crimes are being formulated to create a broad and sweeping net to capture Internet predators of children, and while the ends are legitimate, the means used are constitutionally suspect. Congress has the power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce. When looking at the federal statute that substantially defines a crime as follows: Whoever-- 1. Using a means of interstate commerce 2. Knowingly 3. solicits 4. any minor 5. to engage in illegal sexual activity shall be fined and/or imprisoned. Solicitation of another to engage in criminal activity is only prepatory to the crime and not an overt act, which would support a conviction for attempt. To call solicitation an attempt is to delete the overt act element necessary for an attempt. Therefore, solicitation alone can never serve as a basis for attempted sexual abuse of a minor. It is too far attenuated, it lacks the substantial step necessary to constitute an attempt. At best, solicitation is in the nature of an attempt because the intent is there, but the overt act is missing. Attempted solicitation or enticement would then be yet another step removed from the actual harm that the law seeks to prevent. At best, it is an attempt to commit a crime in the nature of an attempt. Many courts have ruled that there is no such crime as an attempt to commit an attempt or an attempt to commit a crime that is in the nature of an attempt. Punishing an individual's beliefs (or erroneous beliefs) or evil intent rather than his culpable conduct is just as reprehensible under our Constitution as punishing status rather than culpable conduct. Read commonwealth vs. Jerry Hamel; http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getc...913&invol=1 Another case discussing the MPC's focus on the actor's mind: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/arc...s/p_dlugash.htm A review of the decision and the law of criminal attempt discloses several constitutional defects in the prosecution of the defendant in this case. Strong arguments can be made that: 1) The statute is constitutionally void for vagueness because it fails to provide notice of the elements of the crime of attempt and because it fails to provide courts with clearly defined standards for applying the law. 2) The federal court, in adopting the Model Penal Code (MPC) definition of criminal attempt, violated the constitutional separation of powers doctrine and usurped the power of the legislative branch to define crimes. The people of this country did not elect the American Law Institute (ALI) or the drafters of the MPC to make public policy decisions and to define crimes. The legislative branch's power to define crimes (to set forth the essential elements that constitute a crime) reflects the public policy decisions of our elected representatives in Congress and this power/duty cannot be delegated to the ALI or the judicial branch. 3) If the common law definition of the crime of attempt is applied to this case, than the MPC definition then the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove the overt act (CONDUCT) element of the offense. It cannot be proved that the defendant's conduct came dangerously close to the commission of the actual crime. The bottom line in this case is if there is no act there is no crime, the culpable conduct is being diluted to the point where we are no longer trying to prevent or punish crime, rather, we are punishing the mere possession of an evil mind.

The practice has become widespread undercover agents pose as children on Internet chat rooms. When adults strike up online relationships and arrange for sexual liaisons, police are waiting at the rendezvous point with handcuffs and arrest warrants. But a ruling of a federal court judge in Ca is calling the legality of the tactic into question. The U.S. District Judge acquitted a man last week of using the Internet to try to entice a child into sex. The man's attorney, had argued that his client didn't break federal law because the person his client was accused of enticing wasn't a minor but a County deputy pretending to be a minor. The ruling came just minutes after a jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant had faced a sentence of five to 30 years. The Judge reversed the jury's decision not withstanding the verdict. Is anyone bothered by this kind of sting? I'll post my opinion later.

I have a fatal flaw: I constantly torture myself by putting off till tomorrow what I SHOULD be doing today! Occasionally I read about a group called the Procrastinators of America (I think it is). I would be the perfect candidate for that group, but I keep putting off joining. Happy Saturday, now all things can wait until Monday!

You know, I always hear that "if someone really is determined to kill others, nothing really can prevent it, unless they make errors first before implimenting it". Thats 100 percent true. My take is that guns make it far too easy to kill multiple victims, especially from distances, and extremely easy to do so without a measure of premeditation and forethought. A far stricter enforcement of gun laws, which includes making it harder (but not impossible) to obtain a gun, would reduce that ease in killing people. How much of a reduction is debatable and conjecture, but its not hard to see that a reduction would be a consquence, given the impulsive nature of many crimes involving guns. That being said, the best we could hope for, barring a huge social moral shift in our Society, is that particular reduction. Given the fact we are a Free Society, and not a heavily regulated Police State, it will be impossible to entirely prevent intentional killings with guns, just as it would be impossible to prevent intentional killings by other means. There will always be guns in the hands of criminals. The laws mostly effect the law abiding citizens who would use them for protection, not the criminals who rarely get them legally. Yes, I do know that the VT killer got his legally, but in the overall picture, the criminals don't go through the process. So when the good citizens turn in their guns, the bad guys will still have theirs.

Elysa J. Yanowitz v. L'oreal USA, Inc http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n...%20&d=23805 Plaintiff Elysa Yanowitz was a regional sales manager for defendant L'Oreal USA, Inc. (L'Oreal), a cosmetics and fragrance company. A male L'Oreal executive ordered Yanowitz to fire a female employee in her region because the executive found the employee insufficiently attractive. Yanowitz was asked to get him someone "hot" instead. She asked for a better reason. The executive and another executive, who was Yanowitz's immediate supervisor, subjected her to heightened scrutiny and increasingly hostile evaluations over the ensuing months. Within four months, Yanowitz went on stress leave, and her position was eventually filled.</SPAN> Sex discrimination in the workplace comes in many guises. In a most basic form, it involves outright exclusion of women, solely by reason of their sex. Even where women have gained access to the workplace, sex discrimination may persist in other forms, for example, through identification of particular jobs as "man-only" or "woman-only" jobs, through perpetuation of a glass ceiling that ensures women will only rise so high on the corporate ladder, or through the unwritten establishment of two sets of rules for success: for men, based on performance, and for women, based on appearance. Just as an employer may not impose broad rules that regulate men and women differently based on their appearance or sexual desirability, so an employer may not discriminate against specific individuals on these bases. For example, in Priest v. Rotary (N.D.Cal. 1986) 634 F.Supp. 571, an employer demoted a cocktail waitress who refused to wear sexually suggestive attire. The court recognized this as unlawful sex discrimination. (Id. at p. 581.) Similarly, in E.E.O.C. v. Sage Rlty. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F.Supp. 599, the employer insisted that a female office building lobby attendant wear a sexually revealing uniform. When the employee refused, she was dismissed. The court concluded that the employee was required to wear the revealing uniform because she was a woman, and that she had made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. (Id. at pp. 607-608.)

I've never heard of that case. Do you know what state? Quite a few stories like this one are legal myths. Even true stories often prove not to be examples of bad law, but bad lawyering. In most states she would have been tried for cruelty to animals.

The United States Supreme Court said: "We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Apply the above stated rule of law (the Supreme Law of the Land) to an employer's decision that all female employees must wear make up or be fired. The employer then fires a woman because she refused to wear make up. Is it possible for an employer to prove he would have made the same decision (to fire the woman) even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account?

A private employer does not have a protected liberty interest under the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment to discriminate in employment decisions against qualified individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff did not state a claim under Title VII -- that her employer's requirement that female employees wear make up as a condition of employment was NOT sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. But See PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getc...0&invol=228 To improve her chances for partnership, Hopkins was advised that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees. 3 Yet, the statute does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take into account in making employment decisions. The converse, therefore, of "for cause" legislation, 4 Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us. Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. In now-familiar language, the statute forbids [490 U.S. 228, 240] an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). 5 We take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. The critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of 703(a)(1), is whether gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made. Our interpretation of the words "because of" also is supported by the fact that Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a "bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e). The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her. Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to employment opportunities. An employer may not, we have held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction of facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups when those tests or qualifications are not required for performance of the job. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). . . . In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. 13 In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last proposition, the placement by Price Waterhouse of "sex stereotyping" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems to us an insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in this case or that it lacks legal relevance. We reject both possibilities. GENDER is most certainly factor in an employment decision when the employer conditions a female employee's employment on wearing cosmetics -- foundation, blush, mascara, and lip color. The requirement that a woman wear make-up or lose her job is NOT a facially neutral qualification for the job -- and that's where the Ninth Circuit went wrong in its decision. The Ninth Circuit treated this as a "disparate impact" case when it wasn't a disparate impact case. The employer made an employment decision based on GENDER and acted on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot successfully mix, pour, or sell drinks to customers unless she wears make up. This is unlawful sex stereotyping.

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1104154529743 In an opinion likely to raise the ire of civil rights and feminist groups, a divided 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled that a woman who was fired from her job as a casino bartender for refusing to wear makeup cannot sue for sex discrimination. The 2-1 decision rejected bartender Darlene Jespersen's argument that Harrah's Operating Co. violated her rights when it implemented "Personal Best" image standards requiring women to wear makeup and men to trim their fingernails and keep their hair short. "Even if we were to take judicial notice of the fact that the application of makeup requires some expenditure of time and money, Jespersen would still have the burden of producing some evidence that the burdens associated with the makeup requirement are greater than the burdens the 'Personal Best' policy imposes on male bartenders," Senior Judge A. Wallace Tashima wrote for the majority. Judge Barry Silverman concurred. Judge Sidney Thomas dissented, saying that a jury easily could have found that the makeup requirement illegally requires female employees to conform to sex stereotypes, or that it places more of a burden on women than Harrah's male grooming standards. "Sex-differentiated appearance standards stemming from stereotypes that women are unfit for work, fulfill a different role in the workplace, or are incapable of exercising professional judgment systematically impose a burden on women, converting such stereotypes into stubborn reality," Thomas wrote. Jespersen worked as a sports bartender at Harrah's in Reno, Nev., for nearly two decades and received exemplary performance evaluations. Harrah's encouraged female beverage servers to wear makeup, but it was not required. Jespersen briefly tried wearing makeup but later stopped because she felt it "forced her to be feminine" and to become "dolled up" like a sex object. The company changed its appearance standards in 2000, announcing the goal of a "brand standard of excellence." It required female bartenders to use nail polish and wear their hair down and either "teased, curled or styled." Later the rule was amended to add makeup, which Harrah's defined as "foundation/concealer and/or face powder, as well as blush and mascara," plus lip color. Male bartenders, meanwhile, were required to wear their hair above the collar and keep their nails clean and neatly trimmed. Makeup, ponytails and nail polish were banned for men. Jespersen was terminated in July 2000 after refusing to comply with the makeup requirements. A district court granted summary judgment for Harrah's, ruling that its policy did not impose unequal burdens on the sexes. The 9th Circuit agreed. Tashima wrote that there is "no evidence in the record in support of [Jespersen's] contention" that cosmetics can cost hundreds of dollars per year and that applying them requires a significant investment in time. He further held that Harrah's policy did not run afoul of the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court ruling Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 229, in which a female associate who was perceived as too "macho" successfully challenged her exclusion from an accounting firm's partnership. Tashima wrote that Price Waterhouse "did not address the specific question of whether an employer can impose sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards on its male and female employees." In his dissent, Thomas said Jespersen should be able to bring her case to a jury, adding that the decision leaves service workers unprotected from discrimination. "The distinction created by the majority opinion leaves men and women in service industries, who are more likely to be subject to policies like the Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy, without the protection that white-collar professionals receive," Thomas said. Jespersen's attorney, Jennifer Pizer of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Los Angeles, said the court "erred in a few ways when defining an unequal burden." "There is a burden in makeup costs. And there's the burden of the message that these female employees are subordinate and unacceptable as workers unless they present an ultra-feminine appearance," Pizer said. "Male employees must be clean and neat and look professional and women are deemed unprofessional if they are clean and neat, but don't alter their appearance," she said. Harrah's attorney, Veronica Arechederra Hall of Littler Mendelson's Las Vegas office, referred all questions to Harrah's spokesman Gary Thompson. Thompson said modified appearance standards requiring makeup are still in place at the casino. "We implemented these policies in response to requests from customers accustomed to a level of service and a type of appearance," Thompson said. "This is no different from CBS requiring a female or even a male reporter to wear makeup on television." Jespersen v. Harrah's, 04 C.D.O.S. 11332, attracted numerous amici curiae, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the American Hotel & Lodging Association, among others. Agree or disagree? And why? I'll post my opinion later

Just heard from a young cousin, an undergrad (engineering!) at VT. Called simply to say that's he's fine and not to worry. (That was the first I heard of this terrible news - I thought I just wasn't hearing him right.) Still not clear how/ why there were two separate shootings (same gunman?), in two separate locations. I guess it'll get clearer as the details come out. Both CNN and MSNBC are reporting that there was a lockdown and then it was later lifted and the shooting resumed. It seems odd that they would lift the lockdown without having someone in custody. Very tragic.

First we must take a step back for a moment and review criminal negligence: AS 11.41.130. Criminally Negligent Homicide. (a) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, the person causes the death of another person. (Criminally negligent homicide is a class B felony. In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result. In the context of criminally negligent homicide, criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor's awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional. The man did not intentionally plow his vehicle into another vehicle manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. Certainly, any time a driver takes his eyes off the road, momentarily or otherwise, there is a risk of an accident. The vast majority of the people do not perceive or foresee that death WILL RESULT from their negligent acts, but the law punishes them nevertheless because they should have foreseen the deadly consequences. Foreseeability in the context of negligence requires that a reasonable person must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which may be reasonably foreseen as likely to injure another person. The injured person must be in the zone of danger that is created by the defendant's carelessness and the injury must be a type that is likely (not merely possible) to occur in the circumstances. Certainly, it is always POSSIBLE that a distracted driver will kill someone, but is it more LIKELY than not that he will kill someone? The man wasn't keeping his eyes on the road and for that he was negligent at most But, he didn't intentionally ram his vehicle into another vehicle; he didn't shoot someone with a gun; he didn't intentionally stab someone with a knife; and I find it troubling that we can place him in the same category as people who are true murderers. Aren't we trying to mold pure negligence into something more sinister than it really is? It is possible for the human brain to perceive every negligent or reckless act as a "manifestation of extreme indifference to the value of human life" and therefore completely nullify the purpose for having negligent homicide and manslaughter on the books.