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Have you observed a trend wherein the laws are being manipulated to support harsher charges against person's accused of criminal wrong-doing? Here's a case in point: Murder by DVD Distraction When a pickup truck crossed the double yellow line along Seward Highway and killed two occupants of a Jeep Grand Cherokee, police initially thought the accident was another tragic mistake by a momentarily distracted driver. Then they spotted the dashboard DVD player. In what may be the first trial of its kind in the nation, prosecutors have accused the pickup truck's driver of second-degree murder for watching a movie instead of the road when he crashed head-on into the Jeep. While no Alaska law prohibits operating a DVD player in view of a driver, prosecutor June Stein said the facts warranted charging Petterson under one of two theories: that he knew his conduct was substantially certain to cause death or that he knowingly engaged in conduct showing extreme indifference to human life. Discussion: First, we need to put things into perspective. If you handle a loaded gun, deliberately point the gun at another person's head, and intentionally pull the trigger, then, most definitely, you are engaging in conduct that you know is substantially certain to cause death or you are knowingly engaging in conduct that shows extreme indifference to human life. If you beat someone so bad that the person dies--even though you did not intend to cause that person's death--your actions of deliberately and repeatedly applying your fists or a weapon to another person's body would support a charge of second-degree murder because you engaged in conduct (inflicting injuries) that you know is substantially certain to cause that person's death or you knowingly engaged in conduct that shows extreme indifference to human life. But, if you are distracted by DVD and you plow your vehicle into another vehicle, has your level of culpability risen to the same level of culpability as someone who knowingly shoots another person or someone who beats another person to death? There are different degrees of homicide based on the culpability of the accused. Our criminal laws are specifically graded so that individuals with the greatest culpability are punished more severely than individuals with lesser levels of culpability. If a person engages in negligent conduct and that negligence results in the death of another, that person's culpability would support a negligent homicide charge. If a person engages in reckless conduct and that recklessness results in the death of another, that person's culpability would support a manslaughter charge. Both negligent homicide and manslaughter are serious charges, but the accused simply does not knowingly or intentionally cause the death of another. IMHO, murder charges should be reserved for those who are truly guilty of murder. I am troubled when the law is manipulated to turn people who are merely negligent or reckless into convicted murderers. Are our nation's "tough on crime" prosecutors blurring the lines of culpability upon which criminal laws are based? Do you feel the entire purpose of defining crimes by law and grading them in accordance with culpability is being washed away through manipulation. What are your views?

When Mr. and Mrs. Loving were convicted of the crime of entering into an interracial marriage and were forced to leave Virginia or face incarceration, the trial judge stated the following: "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/388/1.html The judge stated that prejudicial and discriminatory garbage (and justified it in God's name) at a point in time nearly a hundred years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that our courts failed to effectuate the explicit language of the Fourteenth Amendment for a LONG TIME doesn't negate the Fourteenth Amendment or render it meaningless. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously states the following: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Those persons who are morally against same-sex marriages and adoption, like the persons before them who were morally against racially-mixed marriages, have no right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals. The state's power to create and enforce marital and adoption rights must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court must be the final say.

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Actually Luc you brought up some very good points. However assuming someone may be a criminal runs contrary to the due process clause and the presumption of innocence. When discussing whether a law that infringes upon a fundamental right is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, courts often use this language: OVER-INCLUSIVE (overbreath) and UNDER-INCLUSIVE (underbreath). If the compelling state (city) interest is to protect children from possible criminal victimization by pedophiles, prohibiting ALL adults who are unaccompanied by children from entering a public playground is BOTH an over-inclusive and under-inclusive means of serving the compelling government interest. Obviously, not ALL adults unaccompanied by children are pedophiles (over-inclusive)--and it is possible that some adults who ARE accompanied by children ARE pedophiles (under-inclusive). The presence or absence of a child in the company of an adult doesn't have any rational connection to the issue of whether the adult in question MAY or MAY NOT be a pedophile. And finally, if the City specifically made a law that prohibited PEDOPHILES from entering a public park where children are likely to be present, isn't the city penalizing STATUS rather than CONDUCT? It is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to penalize a person for their status rather than their conduct. See ROBINSON v. CALIFORNIA, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). http://laws.findlaw.com/us/370/660.html If the constitution prohibits the government from doing something directly, the government may not get around that prohibition through indirect measures. IMO, it is clearly unconstitutional to prohibit ALL adults unaccompanied by a child from entering a public park because of the remote possibility that the adult might be a pedophile (status) even though the adult's conduct is completely innocent (e.g., sitting on park bench waiting for art festival to begin) Without doubt, the New York City "rule" at issue raises a LOT of constitutional questions.

Providing public facilities (e.g., playground, park benches, public space) to one class of persons while excluding other classes of persons raises issues under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Public grounds, swings, slides, teeter-totters, benches, etc., belong to the entire public to enjoy--not just children and their supervising adults. Most adults enjoy sitting on public benches in public parks, enjoy the fresh air and scenery, and enjoy watching children play in a public playground--and most of them are NOT pedophiles. Even though a lot of people (judges included) use the phrase "constitutional right," its use is misleading. The Constitution does not confer rights. It specificially SECURES some of the rights we retained when our government of limited powers was formed. The people retained everything-- surrendered nothing--when they formed a more perfect union to SECURE the blessings of liberty. In the beginning, the United States Constitution served as security or protection for the people against FEDERAL government intrusions or infringements on our rights. It wasn't until AFTER the civil war and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment that the United States Constitution began to SECURE the blessings of liberty against STATE government intrusions or infringements on our rights. Therefore, when dealing with a STATE or a political subdivision of a STATE infringement (e.g., the City of New York's rule) on life, liberty, or property, we apply the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons from state infringements on life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process means the "law of the land" and includes both a procedural component and a substantive component. The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated persons or classes of person will be treated equally. When analyzing issues that arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts apply different levels of scrutiny. State laws that classify based on race, color, or nationality, or infringe fundamental rights are subjected to strict scrutiny. The state must have a compelling state interest and the means used must be necessary and narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. Freedom of movement within society is a fundamental right. In CITY OF CHICAGO v. MORALES, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the United States Supreme Court considered Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance that prohibited "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observed a person whom the officer reasonably believed to be a gang member "loitering" in a public place with one or more persons, the officer would order them to disperse. Anyone who did not obey the disperse order violated the ordinance. The Court held that the city ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens wrote: While we, like the Illinois courts, conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face, we do not rely on the overbreadth doctrine. We agree with the city's submission that the law does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message. By its terms, the ordinance is inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or opposition to, a particular point of view. Cf. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111 (1969). Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment "right of association" that our cases have recognized. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 23-25 (1989). On the other hand, as the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 We have expressly identified this "right to remove from one place to another according to inclination" as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274 (1900); see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 164 (1972). 20 Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage" Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958), or the right to move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" identified in Blackstone's Commentaries. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 130 (1765). 21 There is no need, however, to decide whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515-517 (1964) (right to travel); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 82-83 (1976) (abortion); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 358 -360, nn. 3, 9. For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement." See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 499 (1982). It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, see Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U. S. 379, 395 (1979), and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, see id. , at 391. When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack. Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 357 . Accordingly, we first consider whether the ordinance provides fair notice to the citizen and then discuss its potential for arbitrary enforcement. In this case, the Court ruled that the Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was void for vagueness under the due process clause. The New York City rule prohibits an adult from entering a public place--a park or playground--unless the adult is accompanied by a child. The rule is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement (it is a strict liability crime) and infringes on constitutionally protected rights. To pass constitutional scrutiny, the rule must serve a compelling state interest and must be NECESSARY and NARROWLY-TAILORED (not overbroad) to serve that compelling state interest. According to the article, the city parks department promulgated the rule in order to keep pedophiles out of public parks--to protect children from becoming victims of pedophiles. The state has a compelling interest in deterring crime and protecting children. However, a rule that prohibits ALL ADULTS from entering a public park unless accompanied by a child is not narrowly-tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Its sweep is too broad and will snare entirely too many law-abiding adults who are NOT pedophiles and are present in the public place for innocent, non-criminal purposes (e.g., sitting on a park bench waiting for an arts festival to begin). Unless the law is declared void for vagueness in violation of the due process clause as in CITY OF CHICAGO v. MORALES, each and every infringement upon your fundamental liberty interests--e.g., your freedom of movement--must be analyzed in accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court: Compelling state interest and necessary, narrowly-tailored means to serve that compelling state interest.

Both excellent points. All the woman was doing was sitting on a park bench, she was only asked if there was a child with her, when she said no, the police wrote the ticket. Fundamental right: Freedom of Movement An adult's right to freely move about and stand still has been recognized as fundamental to a free society. See, eg., PAPACHRISTOU v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) Freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful--knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). When a state has a strong interest in protecting minors, it may restrict their rights in ways in which they could not restrict adults' rights. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944). Accordingly, it might makes some sense for the City to prohibit children from playing in a public park without adult supervision (for their own protection), but it makes no sense to make it a crime for an adult to be in a public place if unaccompanied by a child. Before a municipality may enact valid legislation which infringes on a fundamental right like freedom of movement, the Government must prove a compelling need. Here, the City claims the rule is intended to keep pedophiles out of public parks--i.e., to protect children from pedophiles. Certainly, crime prevention and protecting children is a compelling state interest. But, the rule that prohibits ALL adults who are unaccompanied by children from entering a public park is NOT narrowly tailored to to the city's interest. It is irrational to penalize all adults who are unaccompanied by children in public places as suspected pedophiles. The rule treats all of these adults as persons who criminally victimize children without probable cause to believe they are committing a crime. This runs contrary to the due process clause and the presumption of innocence. The rule is unconstitutionally broad because it prohibits ALL adults (most of whom are not a threat to children) from entering public parks where children might be playing. The number of adults engaged in safe and innocent activity (e.g., sitting on a park bench waiting for an arts festival to begin) certainly outnumber the those engaged in criminal activity. The rule is not a narrowly tailored to the city's interest in protecting children from becoming the victims of pedophiles and is therefore an infringement on an the freedom of movement of adults.

In New York the Rivington Playground on Manhattan's East Side has a small sign at the entrance that says adults are prohibited unless they are accompanied by a child. Sandra Catena, 47, said she didn't see the sign when she sat down to wait for an arts festival to start. Two police officers asked her if she was with a child. When she said no, they gave her a ticket that could bring a $1,000 fine and 90 days in jail. The city parks department said the rule is designed to keep pedophiles out of city parks, but a parks spokesman told the Daily News that the department hoped police would use some common sense when enforcing the rule. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether the city "rule" that criminally penalizes adults for entering a public park when unaccompanied by a child is unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to Sandra Catena?

IMO, dealing with it is about honouring and respecting the life that was lived - however short or long - and seeing it as having its own integrity and wholeness.

Liberty, justice, and equal protection under the law are basic concepts that are not subject to the whims of majoritarian politics and elections. Rights protected by the Constitution against governmental usurpations must be vindicated by our courts. Some peoples desire to leave the determination of the individual rights of disfavored minorities in the hands of majoritarian politics flies in the face of the constitutional values upon which this country was founded. If the moral majority of persons in this country may deprive homosexuals of their fundamental rights and equality within society based solely on their prejudices and moral disapproval, and if homosexuals cannot seek redress in our courts of law, then this ain't America.

There is no dispute that this country has a LONG HISTORY of prejudice and bias that resulted in the unequal treatment of many classes of persons. As a nation, we have a reprehensible history of depriving persons of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution. We have a reprehensible history of depriving persons of equal protection of the laws. That history is dripping with the discrimination, prejudice, animus, and oppression of disfavored classes of persons. Despite the existence of explicit constitutional protection, members of disfavored classes of persons have often been afraid to step forward to assert their rights to be treated as equal members of society.

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