MMandM

You know, I always hear that "if someone really is determined to kill others, nothing really can prevent it, unless they make errors first before implimenting it". Thats 100 percent true. My take is that guns make it far too easy to kill multiple victims, especially from distances, and extremely easy to do so without a measure of premeditation and forethought. A far stricter enforcement of gun laws, which includes making it harder (but not impossible) to obtain a gun, would reduce that ease in killing people. How much of a reduction is debatable and conjecture, but its not hard to see that a reduction would be a consquence, given the impulsive nature of many crimes involving guns. That being said, the best we could hope for, barring a huge social moral shift in our Society, is that particular reduction. Given the fact we are a Free Society, and not a heavily regulated Police State, it will be impossible to entirely prevent intentional killings with guns, just as it would be impossible to prevent intentional killings by other means. There will always be guns in the hands of criminals. The laws mostly effect the law abiding citizens who would use them for protection, not the criminals who rarely get them legally. Yes, I do know that the VT killer got his legally, but in the overall picture, the criminals don't go through the process. So when the good citizens turn in their guns, the bad guys will still have theirs.

Elysa J. Yanowitz v. L'oreal USA, Inc http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n...%20&d=23805 Plaintiff Elysa Yanowitz was a regional sales manager for defendant L'Oreal USA, Inc. (L'Oreal), a cosmetics and fragrance company. A male L'Oreal executive ordered Yanowitz to fire a female employee in her region because the executive found the employee insufficiently attractive. Yanowitz was asked to get him someone "hot" instead. She asked for a better reason. The executive and another executive, who was Yanowitz's immediate supervisor, subjected her to heightened scrutiny and increasingly hostile evaluations over the ensuing months. Within four months, Yanowitz went on stress leave, and her position was eventually filled.</SPAN> Sex discrimination in the workplace comes in many guises. In a most basic form, it involves outright exclusion of women, solely by reason of their sex. Even where women have gained access to the workplace, sex discrimination may persist in other forms, for example, through identification of particular jobs as "man-only" or "woman-only" jobs, through perpetuation of a glass ceiling that ensures women will only rise so high on the corporate ladder, or through the unwritten establishment of two sets of rules for success: for men, based on performance, and for women, based on appearance. Just as an employer may not impose broad rules that regulate men and women differently based on their appearance or sexual desirability, so an employer may not discriminate against specific individuals on these bases. For example, in Priest v. Rotary (N.D.Cal. 1986) 634 F.Supp. 571, an employer demoted a cocktail waitress who refused to wear sexually suggestive attire. The court recognized this as unlawful sex discrimination. (Id. at p. 581.) Similarly, in E.E.O.C. v. Sage Rlty. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F.Supp. 599, the employer insisted that a female office building lobby attendant wear a sexually revealing uniform. When the employee refused, she was dismissed. The court concluded that the employee was required to wear the revealing uniform because she was a woman, and that she had made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. (Id. at pp. 607-608.)

I've never heard of that case. Do you know what state? Quite a few stories like this one are legal myths. Even true stories often prove not to be examples of bad law, but bad lawyering. In most states she would have been tried for cruelty to animals.

The United States Supreme Court said: "We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Apply the above stated rule of law (the Supreme Law of the Land) to an employer's decision that all female employees must wear make up or be fired. The employer then fires a woman because she refused to wear make up. Is it possible for an employer to prove he would have made the same decision (to fire the woman) even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account?

A private employer does not have a protected liberty interest under the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment to discriminate in employment decisions against qualified individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff did not state a claim under Title VII -- that her employer's requirement that female employees wear make up as a condition of employment was NOT sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. But See PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getc...0&invol=228 To improve her chances for partnership, Hopkins was advised that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees. 3 Yet, the statute does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take into account in making employment decisions. The converse, therefore, of "for cause" legislation, 4 Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us. Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. In now-familiar language, the statute forbids [490 U.S. 228, 240] an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). 5 We take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. The critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of 703(a)(1), is whether gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made. Our interpretation of the words "because of" also is supported by the fact that Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a "bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e). The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her. Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to employment opportunities. An employer may not, we have held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction of facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups when those tests or qualifications are not required for performance of the job. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). . . . In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. 13 In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last proposition, the placement by Price Waterhouse of "sex stereotyping" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems to us an insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in this case or that it lacks legal relevance. We reject both possibilities. GENDER is most certainly factor in an employment decision when the employer conditions a female employee's employment on wearing cosmetics -- foundation, blush, mascara, and lip color. The requirement that a woman wear make-up or lose her job is NOT a facially neutral qualification for the job -- and that's where the Ninth Circuit went wrong in its decision. The Ninth Circuit treated this as a "disparate impact" case when it wasn't a disparate impact case. The employer made an employment decision based on GENDER and acted on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot successfully mix, pour, or sell drinks to customers unless she wears make up. This is unlawful sex stereotyping.

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1104154529743 In an opinion likely to raise the ire of civil rights and feminist groups, a divided 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled that a woman who was fired from her job as a casino bartender for refusing to wear makeup cannot sue for sex discrimination. The 2-1 decision rejected bartender Darlene Jespersen's argument that Harrah's Operating Co. violated her rights when it implemented "Personal Best" image standards requiring women to wear makeup and men to trim their fingernails and keep their hair short. "Even if we were to take judicial notice of the fact that the application of makeup requires some expenditure of time and money, Jespersen would still have the burden of producing some evidence that the burdens associated with the makeup requirement are greater than the burdens the 'Personal Best' policy imposes on male bartenders," Senior Judge A. Wallace Tashima wrote for the majority. Judge Barry Silverman concurred. Judge Sidney Thomas dissented, saying that a jury easily could have found that the makeup requirement illegally requires female employees to conform to sex stereotypes, or that it places more of a burden on women than Harrah's male grooming standards. "Sex-differentiated appearance standards stemming from stereotypes that women are unfit for work, fulfill a different role in the workplace, or are incapable of exercising professional judgment systematically impose a burden on women, converting such stereotypes into stubborn reality," Thomas wrote. Jespersen worked as a sports bartender at Harrah's in Reno, Nev., for nearly two decades and received exemplary performance evaluations. Harrah's encouraged female beverage servers to wear makeup, but it was not required. Jespersen briefly tried wearing makeup but later stopped because she felt it "forced her to be feminine" and to become "dolled up" like a sex object. The company changed its appearance standards in 2000, announcing the goal of a "brand standard of excellence." It required female bartenders to use nail polish and wear their hair down and either "teased, curled or styled." Later the rule was amended to add makeup, which Harrah's defined as "foundation/concealer and/or face powder, as well as blush and mascara," plus lip color. Male bartenders, meanwhile, were required to wear their hair above the collar and keep their nails clean and neatly trimmed. Makeup, ponytails and nail polish were banned for men. Jespersen was terminated in July 2000 after refusing to comply with the makeup requirements. A district court granted summary judgment for Harrah's, ruling that its policy did not impose unequal burdens on the sexes. The 9th Circuit agreed. Tashima wrote that there is "no evidence in the record in support of [Jespersen's] contention" that cosmetics can cost hundreds of dollars per year and that applying them requires a significant investment in time. He further held that Harrah's policy did not run afoul of the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court ruling Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 229, in which a female associate who was perceived as too "macho" successfully challenged her exclusion from an accounting firm's partnership. Tashima wrote that Price Waterhouse "did not address the specific question of whether an employer can impose sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards on its male and female employees." In his dissent, Thomas said Jespersen should be able to bring her case to a jury, adding that the decision leaves service workers unprotected from discrimination. "The distinction created by the majority opinion leaves men and women in service industries, who are more likely to be subject to policies like the Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy, without the protection that white-collar professionals receive," Thomas said. Jespersen's attorney, Jennifer Pizer of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Los Angeles, said the court "erred in a few ways when defining an unequal burden." "There is a burden in makeup costs. And there's the burden of the message that these female employees are subordinate and unacceptable as workers unless they present an ultra-feminine appearance," Pizer said. "Male employees must be clean and neat and look professional and women are deemed unprofessional if they are clean and neat, but don't alter their appearance," she said. Harrah's attorney, Veronica Arechederra Hall of Littler Mendelson's Las Vegas office, referred all questions to Harrah's spokesman Gary Thompson. Thompson said modified appearance standards requiring makeup are still in place at the casino. "We implemented these policies in response to requests from customers accustomed to a level of service and a type of appearance," Thompson said. "This is no different from CBS requiring a female or even a male reporter to wear makeup on television." Jespersen v. Harrah's, 04 C.D.O.S. 11332, attracted numerous amici curiae, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the American Hotel & Lodging Association, among others. Agree or disagree? And why? I'll post my opinion later

Just heard from a young cousin, an undergrad (engineering!) at VT. Called simply to say that's he's fine and not to worry. (That was the first I heard of this terrible news - I thought I just wasn't hearing him right.) Still not clear how/ why there were two separate shootings (same gunman?), in two separate locations. I guess it'll get clearer as the details come out. Both CNN and MSNBC are reporting that there was a lockdown and then it was later lifted and the shooting resumed. It seems odd that they would lift the lockdown without having someone in custody. Very tragic.

First we must take a step back for a moment and review criminal negligence: AS 11.41.130. Criminally Negligent Homicide. (a) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, the person causes the death of another person. (Criminally negligent homicide is a class B felony. In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result. In the context of criminally negligent homicide, criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor's awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional. The man did not intentionally plow his vehicle into another vehicle manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. Certainly, any time a driver takes his eyes off the road, momentarily or otherwise, there is a risk of an accident. The vast majority of the people do not perceive or foresee that death WILL RESULT from their negligent acts, but the law punishes them nevertheless because they should have foreseen the deadly consequences. Foreseeability in the context of negligence requires that a reasonable person must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which may be reasonably foreseen as likely to injure another person. The injured person must be in the zone of danger that is created by the defendant's carelessness and the injury must be a type that is likely (not merely possible) to occur in the circumstances. Certainly, it is always POSSIBLE that a distracted driver will kill someone, but is it more LIKELY than not that he will kill someone? The man wasn't keeping his eyes on the road and for that he was negligent at most But, he didn't intentionally ram his vehicle into another vehicle; he didn't shoot someone with a gun; he didn't intentionally stab someone with a knife; and I find it troubling that we can place him in the same category as people who are true murderers. Aren't we trying to mold pure negligence into something more sinister than it really is? It is possible for the human brain to perceive every negligent or reckless act as a "manifestation of extreme indifference to the value of human life" and therefore completely nullify the purpose for having negligent homicide and manslaughter on the books.

Have you observed a trend wherein the laws are being manipulated to support harsher charges against person's accused of criminal wrong-doing? Here's a case in point: Murder by DVD Distraction When a pickup truck crossed the double yellow line along Seward Highway and killed two occupants of a Jeep Grand Cherokee, police initially thought the accident was another tragic mistake by a momentarily distracted driver. Then they spotted the dashboard DVD player. In what may be the first trial of its kind in the nation, prosecutors have accused the pickup truck's driver of second-degree murder for watching a movie instead of the road when he crashed head-on into the Jeep. While no Alaska law prohibits operating a DVD player in view of a driver, prosecutor June Stein said the facts warranted charging Petterson under one of two theories: that he knew his conduct was substantially certain to cause death or that he knowingly engaged in conduct showing extreme indifference to human life. Discussion: First, we need to put things into perspective. If you handle a loaded gun, deliberately point the gun at another person's head, and intentionally pull the trigger, then, most definitely, you are engaging in conduct that you know is substantially certain to cause death or you are knowingly engaging in conduct that shows extreme indifference to human life. If you beat someone so bad that the person dies--even though you did not intend to cause that person's death--your actions of deliberately and repeatedly applying your fists or a weapon to another person's body would support a charge of second-degree murder because you engaged in conduct (inflicting injuries) that you know is substantially certain to cause that person's death or you knowingly engaged in conduct that shows extreme indifference to human life. But, if you are distracted by DVD and you plow your vehicle into another vehicle, has your level of culpability risen to the same level of culpability as someone who knowingly shoots another person or someone who beats another person to death? There are different degrees of homicide based on the culpability of the accused. Our criminal laws are specifically graded so that individuals with the greatest culpability are punished more severely than individuals with lesser levels of culpability. If a person engages in negligent conduct and that negligence results in the death of another, that person's culpability would support a negligent homicide charge. If a person engages in reckless conduct and that recklessness results in the death of another, that person's culpability would support a manslaughter charge. Both negligent homicide and manslaughter are serious charges, but the accused simply does not knowingly or intentionally cause the death of another. IMHO, murder charges should be reserved for those who are truly guilty of murder. I am troubled when the law is manipulated to turn people who are merely negligent or reckless into convicted murderers. Are our nation's "tough on crime" prosecutors blurring the lines of culpability upon which criminal laws are based? Do you feel the entire purpose of defining crimes by law and grading them in accordance with culpability is being washed away through manipulation. What are your views?

When Mr. and Mrs. Loving were convicted of the crime of entering into an interracial marriage and were forced to leave Virginia or face incarceration, the trial judge stated the following: "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/388/1.html The judge stated that prejudicial and discriminatory garbage (and justified it in God's name) at a point in time nearly a hundred years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that our courts failed to effectuate the explicit language of the Fourteenth Amendment for a LONG TIME doesn't negate the Fourteenth Amendment or render it meaningless. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously states the following: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Those persons who are morally against same-sex marriages and adoption, like the persons before them who were morally against racially-mixed marriages, have no right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals. The state's power to create and enforce marital and adoption rights must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court must be the final say.

I

Actually Luc you brought up some very good points. However assuming someone may be a criminal runs contrary to the due process clause and the presumption of innocence. When discussing whether a law that infringes upon a fundamental right is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, courts often use this language: OVER-INCLUSIVE (overbreath) and UNDER-INCLUSIVE (underbreath). If the compelling state (city) interest is to protect children from possible criminal victimization by pedophiles, prohibiting ALL adults who are unaccompanied by children from entering a public playground is BOTH an over-inclusive and under-inclusive means of serving the compelling government interest. Obviously, not ALL adults unaccompanied by children are pedophiles (over-inclusive)--and it is possible that some adults who ARE accompanied by children ARE pedophiles (under-inclusive). The presence or absence of a child in the company of an adult doesn't have any rational connection to the issue of whether the adult in question MAY or MAY NOT be a pedophile. And finally, if the City specifically made a law that prohibited PEDOPHILES from entering a public park where children are likely to be present, isn't the city penalizing STATUS rather than CONDUCT? It is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to penalize a person for their status rather than their conduct. See ROBINSON v. CALIFORNIA, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). http://laws.findlaw.com/us/370/660.html If the constitution prohibits the government from doing something directly, the government may not get around that prohibition through indirect measures. IMO, it is clearly unconstitutional to prohibit ALL adults unaccompanied by a child from entering a public park because of the remote possibility that the adult might be a pedophile (status) even though the adult's conduct is completely innocent (e.g., sitting on park bench waiting for art festival to begin) Without doubt, the New York City "rule" at issue raises a LOT of constitutional questions.

Providing public facilities (e.g., playground, park benches, public space) to one class of persons while excluding other classes of persons raises issues under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Public grounds, swings, slides, teeter-totters, benches, etc., belong to the entire public to enjoy--not just children and their supervising adults. Most adults enjoy sitting on public benches in public parks, enjoy the fresh air and scenery, and enjoy watching children play in a public playground--and most of them are NOT pedophiles. Even though a lot of people (judges included) use the phrase "constitutional right," its use is misleading. The Constitution does not confer rights. It specificially SECURES some of the rights we retained when our government of limited powers was formed. The people retained everything-- surrendered nothing--when they formed a more perfect union to SECURE the blessings of liberty. In the beginning, the United States Constitution served as security or protection for the people against FEDERAL government intrusions or infringements on our rights. It wasn't until AFTER the civil war and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment that the United States Constitution began to SECURE the blessings of liberty against STATE government intrusions or infringements on our rights. Therefore, when dealing with a STATE or a political subdivision of a STATE infringement (e.g., the City of New York's rule) on life, liberty, or property, we apply the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons from state infringements on life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process means the "law of the land" and includes both a procedural component and a substantive component. The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated persons or classes of person will be treated equally. When analyzing issues that arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts apply different levels of scrutiny. State laws that classify based on race, color, or nationality, or infringe fundamental rights are subjected to strict scrutiny. The state must have a compelling state interest and the means used must be necessary and narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. Freedom of movement within society is a fundamental right. In CITY OF CHICAGO v. MORALES, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the United States Supreme Court considered Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance that prohibited "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observed a person whom the officer reasonably believed to be a gang member "loitering" in a public place with one or more persons, the officer would order them to disperse. Anyone who did not obey the disperse order violated the ordinance. The Court held that the city ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens wrote: While we, like the Illinois courts, conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face, we do not rely on the overbreadth doctrine. We agree with the city's submission that the law does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message. By its terms, the ordinance is inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or opposition to, a particular point of view. Cf. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111 (1969). Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment "right of association" that our cases have recognized. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 23-25 (1989). On the other hand, as the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 We have expressly identified this "right to remove from one place to another according to inclination" as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274 (1900); see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 164 (1972). 20 Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage" Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958), or the right to move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" identified in Blackstone's Commentaries. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 130 (1765). 21 There is no need, however, to decide whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515-517 (1964) (right to travel); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 82-83 (1976) (abortion); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 358 -360, nn. 3, 9. For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement." See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 499 (1982). It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, see Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U. S. 379, 395 (1979), and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, see id. , at 391. When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack. Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 357 . Accordingly, we first consider whether the ordinance provides fair notice to the citizen and then discuss its potential for arbitrary enforcement. In this case, the Court ruled that the Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was void for vagueness under the due process clause. The New York City rule prohibits an adult from entering a public place--a park or playground--unless the adult is accompanied by a child. The rule is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement (it is a strict liability crime) and infringes on constitutionally protected rights. To pass constitutional scrutiny, the rule must serve a compelling state interest and must be NECESSARY and NARROWLY-TAILORED (not overbroad) to serve that compelling state interest. According to the article, the city parks department promulgated the rule in order to keep pedophiles out of public parks--to protect children from becoming victims of pedophiles. The state has a compelling interest in deterring crime and protecting children. However, a rule that prohibits ALL ADULTS from entering a public park unless accompanied by a child is not narrowly-tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Its sweep is too broad and will snare entirely too many law-abiding adults who are NOT pedophiles and are present in the public place for innocent, non-criminal purposes (e.g., sitting on a park bench waiting for an arts festival to begin). Unless the law is declared void for vagueness in violation of the due process clause as in CITY OF CHICAGO v. MORALES, each and every infringement upon your fundamental liberty interests--e.g., your freedom of movement--must be analyzed in accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court: Compelling state interest and necessary, narrowly-tailored means to serve that compelling state interest.

Both excellent points. All the woman was doing was sitting on a park bench, she was only asked if there was a child with her, when she said no, the police wrote the ticket. Fundamental right: Freedom of Movement An adult's right to freely move about and stand still has been recognized as fundamental to a free society. See, eg., PAPACHRISTOU v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) Freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful--knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). When a state has a strong interest in protecting minors, it may restrict their rights in ways in which they could not restrict adults' rights. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944). Accordingly, it might makes some sense for the City to prohibit children from playing in a public park without adult supervision (for their own protection), but it makes no sense to make it a crime for an adult to be in a public place if unaccompanied by a child. Before a municipality may enact valid legislation which infringes on a fundamental right like freedom of movement, the Government must prove a compelling need. Here, the City claims the rule is intended to keep pedophiles out of public parks--i.e., to protect children from pedophiles. Certainly, crime prevention and protecting children is a compelling state interest. But, the rule that prohibits ALL adults who are unaccompanied by children from entering a public park is NOT narrowly tailored to to the city's interest. It is irrational to penalize all adults who are unaccompanied by children in public places as suspected pedophiles. The rule treats all of these adults as persons who criminally victimize children without probable cause to believe they are committing a crime. This runs contrary to the due process clause and the presumption of innocence. The rule is unconstitutionally broad because it prohibits ALL adults (most of whom are not a threat to children) from entering public parks where children might be playing. The number of adults engaged in safe and innocent activity (e.g., sitting on a park bench waiting for an arts festival to begin) certainly outnumber the those engaged in criminal activity. The rule is not a narrowly tailored to the city's interest in protecting children from becoming the victims of pedophiles and is therefore an infringement on an the freedom of movement of adults.

In New York the Rivington Playground on Manhattan's East Side has a small sign at the entrance that says adults are prohibited unless they are accompanied by a child. Sandra Catena, 47, said she didn't see the sign when she sat down to wait for an arts festival to start. Two police officers asked her if she was with a child. When she said no, they gave her a ticket that could bring a $1,000 fine and 90 days in jail. The city parks department said the rule is designed to keep pedophiles out of city parks, but a parks spokesman told the Daily News that the department hoped police would use some common sense when enforcing the rule. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether the city "rule" that criminally penalizes adults for entering a public park when unaccompanied by a child is unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to Sandra Catena?

IMO, dealing with it is about honouring and respecting the life that was lived - however short or long - and seeing it as having its own integrity and wholeness.

Liberty, justice, and equal protection under the law are basic concepts that are not subject to the whims of majoritarian politics and elections. Rights protected by the Constitution against governmental usurpations must be vindicated by our courts. Some peoples desire to leave the determination of the individual rights of disfavored minorities in the hands of majoritarian politics flies in the face of the constitutional values upon which this country was founded. If the moral majority of persons in this country may deprive homosexuals of their fundamental rights and equality within society based solely on their prejudices and moral disapproval, and if homosexuals cannot seek redress in our courts of law, then this ain't America.

There is no dispute that this country has a LONG HISTORY of prejudice and bias that resulted in the unequal treatment of many classes of persons. As a nation, we have a reprehensible history of depriving persons of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution. We have a reprehensible history of depriving persons of equal protection of the laws. That history is dripping with the discrimination, prejudice, animus, and oppression of disfavored classes of persons. Despite the existence of explicit constitutional protection, members of disfavored classes of persons have often been afraid to step forward to assert their rights to be treated as equal members of society.

Hi, I